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This paper proposes a new approach of fighting collusion in tournaments which sheds
light on the principle of divide and conquer: the principal can benefit from manipulating
information revelation, by which he brings asymmetric information between the agents and
thus creates a distortion of eﬃciency in the coalition. We employ a simple tournament
setting where, due to perfect collusion, the eﬃcient eﬀort levels are impossible to be
implemented through simple mechanisms. We propose a sophisticated mechanism with a
biased promotion rule that allows the principal to manipulate the revelation of information
and make asymmetric information between the agents, which brings trade-oﬀs between
rent-extraction and distortion of eﬃciency into the coalition. We show that, it is possible
to implement eﬃcient eﬀort levels under the sophisticated mechanism.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Rank-order tournaments prevail in organizations when there is diﬃculty in ver-
ifying agents’ performance; and they are proved to be eﬀective incentive schemes in
many institutions such as bureaucracies and armies, as well as corporations. The
fixed-prize tournament contracts serve as commitment devices for contract design-
ers as well as competitive mechanisms for agents whose eﬀort levels are unobservable
by others, and these properties are analyzed in the literature of contract theory and
labor economics.3
There is, however, a great challenge to the eﬃcacy of tournaments in practice:
the fixed-prize incentive schemes based on relative performance are vulnerable to
collusion. As relative performance is determined by relative rather than absolute
eﬀort levels, this allows agents to reduce their absolute eﬀort levels while still keep
their relative eﬀort levels unchanged. In the case of homogenous agents, the rank
orders when all agents work are the same as when all shirk, which means that
the agents can benefit from saving their eﬀort costs. This nature of tournament
mechanism will eventually lead to agents’ cooperative sabotages, which aims to
reduce their eﬀorts collectively. When the agents can form a coalition enforced
1The original version is titled "Divide and Conquer".
2 I am grateful to Bruno Jullien, Hideshi Itoh, Shingo Ishiguro, David Martimort and Jean
Tirole for their important comments. I am especially grateful to my supervisor, Patrick Rey,
for his valuable guidance. Financial support from Chinese Scholarship Commission is greatly
acknowledged.
3For instance, see Green and Stokey (1983), Lazear and Rosen (1981), Nalebuﬀ and Stiglitz
(1983).
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by a side contract, it is impossible to induce eﬃcient eﬀort levels under simple
tournament mechanisms, as argued by Ishiguro (2004).
The phenomenon of collusion under tournaments is commonly observed in bu-
reaucratic institutes as well as firms, which results to the loss of eﬃciency in these
organizations. For example, as Miller (1992) describes a so-called "binging" game
played between works when discussing the compensation scheme of the banking-
wiring room in the Hawthorne plant of Western Electric; this game is employed to
punish the workers who produce too much, which is indeed a collusion-enforcing
device to prevent the workers from exerting high eﬀort levels. While the reported
cases of collusion in tournaments can be found in almost every kind of organiza-
tions, they are still a tip of the iceberg: due to their illegality, the collusive coalition
hide themselves, we observe only a part of discovered coalition.
Since the tournaments were created as a promotion device in bureaucratic sys-
tems from ancient dynasties, the phenomenon of collusion has been an austere
threat to these organizations. Fighting collusion thus has become a permanent
challenge to the politicians and scholars in political science and sociology. How-
ever, collusive phenomena have been by and large ignored by the economists, with a
few exceptions of Chichago School’s approach to regulatory capture in 1970s. Since
1980s, there has been a growing interest in studying collusive behavior, in various
environments such as industrial organization, regulation and political economy.
This paper is motived to bring some new ideas for fighting collusion in tour-
naments, which highlights the spirit of "divide and conquer": in order to prevent
collusion, the principal should create conflicts among coalition members rather than
give up stakes to agents. One of the eﬀective way of creating conflicts is to intro-
duce asymmetric information between agents, as recorded by the following famous
story in Chinese history.
About 1800 years ago in Chinese Dynasty of Three Kingdoms, a war was broken
out between the primer minister of Han Dynasty Cao Cao and a coalition formed by
two local governors in Northwestern China, Chao Ma and Sui Han. In the coalition,
Chao Ma, whose father was murdered by Cao Cao, is an aggressive young general,
and he launched the war to revenge for his father. Sui Han who was a good friend
of Ma’s father, however, was once to be a colleague of Cao Cao in bureaucracy,
and he was involved in the war to help Ma. The war was in stalemate after several
rounds of severe battles, which made both sides fretted. At one night, Cao Cao was
inspired by a good trick. He wrote a letter to Sui Han, which was nothing but a
trivial letter of greeting, and then blacked some sentences deliberately. While Sui
Han was wondering at this strange letter, Chao Ma rushed into his room full of
anger. A dispute between them was inevitable as Ma insisted that it must be Han
who blacked these sentences in order to conceal some important information. The
irreconcilable conflict led to a failure of the coalition, as a result, both armies were
defeated by Cao Cao finally.4
In this famous story, the strange letter with blacked sentences brings asym-
metric information between two allies, which creates conflict inside the coalition.
This conflict cannot be reconciled since the coalition is sustained by non-binding
agreement, and the coalition collapses as a result.
When a coalition is enforced by a binding agreement or side contract, such
as in organized crime and political cliques, introducing asymmetric information
4This story is recorded in "A Romance of Three Kingdoms", a famous Chinese historical
romance.
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between agents can bring trade-oﬀs between rent-extraction and distortion of eﬃ-
ciency, which undermines the coalition and benefits the principal as a result. Based
on this idea, we develop a sophisticated mechanism in a simple tournament setting,
which allows the principal to manipulate information revelation and thus introduce
asymmetric information between agents. In this mechanism, the principal designs
a biased promotion rule that favors a lucky agent who is chosen at random. After
selecting the lucky agent, the principal hides the information about who is lucky
or not and then reveals it only to one agent. This creates asymmetric information
between agents and thus brings trade-oﬀs between rent-extraction and eﬃciency
in the coalition. Moreover, the eﬀect of countervailing incentives arises due to the
diﬀerence of participation costs between lucky and unlucky type, which brings an
incentive for the unlucky type to mimic the lucky type. To extract information
rents of the unlucky type, the coalition has to distort its eﬃciency by inducing
high eﬀort levels when the informed agent is lucky type. Hence, it is possible to
implement eﬃcient eﬀort levels under the sophisticated mechanism.
In this paper, we are not motivated to seek for an optimal collusion-proof mech-
anism which implements the eﬃcient eﬀort pair at least costs. The main con-
tribution of this paper is of two folds: first, the principle of divide and conquer is
highlighted at the first time, which brings a new and active concept to the theory of
collusion-proof mechanism design. Second, while the Revelation Principle fails un-
der collusion, restricting attention only to direct collusion-proof mechanisms would
be never optimal. This paper proves that, the indirect and sophisticated mecha-
nism performs better than the direct and simple mechanisms in fighting collusion,
which appeals to rethink the methodology of the literature.
The theory of collusion-proof mechanism design has grown rapidly since the
seminal paper by Tirole (1986). Under the framework of adverse selection, Laﬀont
and Martimort (1997) have shown that the optimal outcome can be made collusion-
proof at no cost to the principal if the agents’ types are uncorrelated; however,
Laﬀont and Martimort (2000) have also shown that preventing collusion entails
strict cost to the principal with correlated types. More recently, Che and Kim (2005)
develop a general method for collusion-proof mechanism design, which utilizes the
idea of "selling the firm to the agents". They show that any payoﬀ attainable by
the principal in the absence of collusion can be attained in the presence of collusion,
in a large class of environments with risk neutral agents for both uncorrelated and
correlated types cases whenever there are more than two agents. However, when
there are only two agents whose types are correlated, collusion-proof entails strictly
costs under their mechanism.
Under moral hazard settings, Varian (1990) has shown that preventing collusion
is costly to the principal if agents’ actions are privately observable. However, when
agents can mutually observe each others’ actions, Itoh (1993) shows that the prin-
cipal can benefit from agents’ side contracting and mutually monitoring, whereas
the first-best allocations are unattainable due to perfect collusion. When outputs
are unverifiable, preventing collusion becomes more diﬃcult under rank-order tour-
naments, in the sense that, eﬃcient eﬀort levels is impossible to be implemented
under collusion, as shown by Ishiguro (2004).
The basic framework of collusion-proof mechanism design is built on contract
theory, which allows to integrates collusion as part of the general mechanism design
under a hierarchy of organizations. As a shortcut of the methodology, it is assumed
that a coalition is formed through a side contract, which is designed and enforced
by a benevolent third party called side mediator.
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The so-called "full-side-contracting" assumption plays a key role in collusion-
proof mechanism design; it provides a simple and neat approach in modeling coali-
tion formation and thus avoids the problem of finding an extensive form for de-
scribing the collusive game between agents. The third party paradigm can be seen
as a black box for the repeated interaction by which collusion emerges, and it
characterizes the upper bound that can be achieved by the coalition.
While the literature restricts attention to the public enforcement of grand con-
tract, the relative situation between the principal and collusive agents is not charac-
terized adequately, as argued by Chen (2006b). It is assumed that the side contract
is enforced privately, as a black box which cannot be observed by the principal;
while the grand contract is enforced publicly, as a transparent box observed by the
coalition. Then, the situation between the principal and collusive agents is asym-
metric in the sense that, the coalition is entitled more contracting power than the
principal who is restricted only to public contracting.
Chen (2006b) then introduce the an new approach of private enforcement to
fight collusion, in a framework of moral hazard with mutually observed actions a
la Itoh (1993); and show that first-best allocation can be implemented through an
indirect mechanism which incorporates secret reporting and private enforcing of
transfers.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, a simple tournament
model is presented. As a benchmark, in section 3, we derive the optimal tournament
contract in the absence of collusion and then illustrate the impossibility result of
implementing eﬃcient eﬀort pair. In section 4, we introduce a biased promotion
rule to make eﬀorts pair-wise identifiable, and shows that it is not suﬃcient to
implement eﬃcient eﬀort pair. We then develop the sophisticated mechanism with
manipulated information in section 5 and show the main theme which asserts that
eﬃcient eﬀort pair is possible to be implemented. We finally conclude in section 5.
2. THE MODEL
A risk-neutral principal has two independent tasks delegated to two identical
and risk-neutral agents, A1 and A2, whose eﬀort levels are only privately observable.
Agents are recruited from a competitive labor market and protected by limited li-
ability with reservation salary 0. Each agent i, i = 1, 2, can choose an eﬀort level
ei ∈ {1, 0}, namely "work" or "shirk", at a cost ψ(ei) which satisfies ψ(1) = ψ > 0
and ψ(0) = 0. For a given eﬀort level, each independent production process gener-
ates one of the two possible outcomes q ∈ {q, q}, namely, "success" and "failure",
with q > q. Let π(ei) = π1 (resp. π(ej) = π0) denote the probability of success
given an agent works (resp. shirks), with 1 > π1 > π0 > 0.
Assume that neither absolute nor relative performance is verifiable5. The prin-
cipal can design only a rank-order tournament with fixed prizes, which assigns two
positions, high and low with prize T and 0, to the winner and loser respectively.
The principal benefits only from the success of production which generates a
revenue R to him. His expected utility is expressed by:
V (e) = [π(ei) + π(ej)]R− T ,
5This assumption is less restrictive than Ishiguro (2004) who assumes that the relative perfor-
mance, or rank-oders are verifiable. As we will see later, when the relative performance is not
verifiable, Ishiguro’s discrimination mechanism cannot be employed.
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For any eﬀort pair e = (ei, ej), denote by pi(e) agent i’s probability of winning.
Agent i’s expected utility is given by:
Ui(e) = pi(e)T − ψ(ei).
The following notation is useful for simplicity:
e = (0, 0), be = (1, 0), e= (0, 1), e = (1, 1),
where the first variable stands for agent Ai’s eﬀort level and second for his
peer’s.
Let ∆π = π1 − π0 denote the probability premium of success when an agent
works rather than shirks. Assume the benefits from agents success are so large that
the principal always prefers agents’ working; this allows us to focus on the problem
of implementing eﬃcient eﬀort pair e.
3. BENCHMARK: SIMPLE TOURNAMENT MECHANISM
In the absence of collusion, the second-best tournament prize of implement-
ing eﬃcient eﬀort pair e can be derived from solving the following optimization
program:
(P.1) Min T
Subject to:
(IRi) Ui(e) = pi(e)T − ψ ≥ 0, i = 1, 2.
(ICi) Ui(e) ≥ pi(e)T , i = 1, 2.
Where (IRi) is agent Ai’s participation constraint and (ICi) is his incentive
compatibility constraint of working.
Suppose the promotion rule is fair and symmetric: if agent Ai has better per-
formance than his peer, then he gets the high position and his peer gets the low
position; if both agents have the same performance, then ties are broken by tossing
an unbiased coin which assigns each agent probability of winning 12 . Given an eﬀort
pair e = (ei, ej), this promotion rule yields the following probability of winning:
pi(ei, ej) = Pr{qi > qj |e}+ 12 Pr{qi = qj |e} = π(ei)(1− π(ej)) + 12 [π(ei)π(ej) +
(1− π(ei))(1− π(ej))]
Under this promotion rule, an agent works rather than shirks if and only if
his expected utility of working 12T − ψ exceeds his expected utility of shirking
[π0(1 − π1) + 12π0π1 +
1
2(1 − π0)(1 − π1)]T , given that his peer works. Hence,
the optimal prize for the high position can be derived from the binding incentive
compatibility constraint (ICi):
T ∗ = 2ψ∆π .
However, this simple mechanism is not robust to collusion. Suppose both agents
collude to take lower eﬀort pair e. The relative performance under eﬀort pair e is the
same as under eﬀort pair e, which implies that each agent can benefit from saving
his eﬀort cost ψ by collectively shirking. Therefore, the agents have incentives to
form coalition. To characterize collusive behavior, we assume that a coalition is
sustained by a side contract:
Assumption 1. (full side contracting) A coalition formed by agents is sus-
tained through a side contract, which is designed and enforced by a benevolent side
mediator.
Assumption 1, which is also called the full-side-contract assumption, allows us
to deal with coalition formation under a neat and simple framework of contract
theory. Under this assumption, the problem of coalition formation is regarded as
an optimization program of the side mediator, whose objective is to maximize the
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total welfare of coalition members, subject to coalition incentive compatibility con-
straints and coalition participation constraints. In other words, we assume that the
constrained Pareto eﬃcient allocations can be attained in the coalition. According
to Myerson (1982), Assumption 1 then warrants the Revelation Principle in side
contracting: without loss of generality, the side mediator can restrict attention to
incentive compatible direct mechanisms.
Under assumption 1, consider the following simple side contract: whoever wins
the prize must pay a side payment s = 12T to his losing peer. Under this side con-
tract, both agents are fully insured under collusion, and thus have no incentives to
work at all. Therefore, this side contract induces the low eﬀort pair e, as expressed
in the following proposition:
Proposition 1. In the presence of collusion, only low eﬀort levels can be im-
plemented under the simple tournament mechanism.
Proof. Denote by cUi(e) agent i’s utility level under collusion, as expressed by:cUi(e) = pi(e)(T − s(e)) + (1− pi(e))s(e)− ψ(ei).
Given any tournament contract, consider the following optimization program of
the side mediator:
[P.1]: maxe T − [ψ(ei) + ψ(ej)]
Subject to: for i = 1, 2,
(CIRi) cUi(e) ≥ Ui(e) = 12T − ψ
(CICi) cUi(e) ≥ cUi(bei, ej) = pi(bei, ej)(T − s(e)) + (1 − pi(bei, ej))s(e) − ψ(bei),
∀bei 6= ei.
(CLL) 0 ≤ s(e) ≤ T .
Where (CIRi) is the coalition participation constraint of agent Ai which brings
stakes of collusion; (CICi) is the coalition incentive compatibility constraint which
resolves agent Ai’s moral hazard in the coalition; and (CLL) is the coalition limited
liability constraint imposed on side payments.
It is easy to check that side contract s(e) = 12T solves the optimization program
[P.1] which implements the low eﬀort pair e. Q.E.D
Proposition 1 asserts that eﬃcient eﬀort pair e is impossible to be implemented
under full side contracting. Ishiguro (2004) also proves this impossibility result in
a diﬀerent setting of tournament. Moreover, when agents’ identities and relative
performance are verifiable such that unanonymous incentive schemes are feasible,
Ishiguro (2004) shows that a discriminatory scheme based on agents’ identities is
suﬃcient to implement asymmetric eﬀort pair be = (1, 0) which induces the favored
agent to work and the disfavored to shirk in spite of collusion. However, under the
assumption of nonverifiable relative performance, Ishiguro (2004) discrimination
mechanism cannot be applied, which implies that only low eﬀort levels can be
induced under simple tournament mechanisms.
4. TOURNAMENT MECHANISM WITH BIASED PROMOTION RULE
The intuition behind this impossibility theorem can be further illustrated. Un-
der the simple tournament mechanism, the promotion rule is unbiased, that is, given
any symmetric eﬀort pair e = (ei, ej) with ei = ej , each agent has equal probability
of winning: pi(e) = pi(e) = 12 , i = 1, 2. In other word, eﬀort pair e and e are not
distinguishable statistically. Hence, the expected rewards of the agents when both
work are the same as when both shirk, which brings the stakes of collusion.
6
Therefore, to break down this impossibility result, the principal must design a
biased promotion rule which generates diﬀerent probability distributions for diﬀer-
ent eﬀort pairs. Consider the following biased promotion rules:
Agent Ai obtains the high position if he has better performance than his peer,
namely, qi > qj . When both agents have the same performance, diﬀerent promotion
rules are employed. If qi = qj = q, ties are broken by an unbiased coin; if qi =
qj = q, then ties are broken through a biased lottery which assigns probability of
winning 1 > v > 12 to the favored agent and 1− v <
1
2 to the disfavored agent.
To avoid discrimination, the favored agent is selected by the principal through
an unbiased coin at the beginning of the game, which ensures that both agents have
equal chance to be favored. The lucky (unlucky) agent who is selected to be favored
(disfavored) by chance is denoted by Al ( Au). For any eﬀort pair e = (ei, ej), the
probability of wining for the lucky and unlucky agent, as denoted by pl and pu
respectively, are expressed by:
pl(ei, ej) = Pr{qi > qj |e}+ v Pr{qi = qj = q|e}+ 12 Pr{qi = qj = q|e}
= π(ei)(1− π(ej)) + vπ(ei)π(ej) + 12(1− π(ei))(1− π(ej))
pu(ei, ej) = Pr{qi > qj |e}+ (1− v) Pr{qi = qj = q|e}+ 12 Pr{qi = qj = q|e}
= π(ei)(1− π(ej)) + (1− v)π(ei)π(ej) + 12(1− π(ei))(1− π(ej))
Let∆p(ei, ej) = pl(ei, ej)−pu(ei, ej) denote the probability premium of winning
that measures the diﬀerence of winning probability between the lucky and unlucky
type; the biased promotion rule then yields ∆p(ei, ej) = (2v − 1)π(ei)π(ej), which
implies ∆p(e) > ∆p(ei, ej), ∀e = (ei, ej) 6= e. Hence, the probability premium
under eﬃcient eﬀort pair e is greater than under low eﬀort pair e, which provides
more incentives of working for the lucky type.
While naked discrimination is prohibited, biased promotion rules which are
diﬃcult to verify, are quite common in bureaucracy, as widely discussed in the
literature of labor economics. Under the biased promotion rule, the agents are
discriminated and thus have diﬀerent status quo utility when they participate in
the coalition. The favored agent who has higher status quo utility level will claim
more stakes of collusion than the disfavored agent, which causes unequal allocation
of stakes in the coalition. If the identity of the favored agent is common knowledge,
the side mediator can then design an unanonymous side contract based on agents’
identities. Allocating stakes through unanonymous side transfers entails no costs
under full side contracting, which implies that there is no loss of eﬃciency in the
coalition. Hence, the simple tournament mechanism with such a biased promotion
rule is not suﬃcient to implement eﬃcient eﬀort pair if the agents’ identities of
being favored or not are common knowledge, as concluded by:
Proposition 2. Under simple tournament mechanisms with biased promotion
rule, only low eﬀort levels can be implemented due to collusion.
Proof. Given any tournament contract with biased promotion rule illustrated
above, denote by S = {sl, su} the side contract which specifies side transfers for the
lucky and unlucky type respectively. Consider the following optimization program
of the side mediator:
[P.1]: maxe T − [ψ(el) + ψ(eu)]
Subject to: for i = 1, 2,
(CIRl) bUl(e) = pl(e)(T − sl) + (1− pl(e))su − ψ(el) ≥ Ul(e) = pl(e)T − ψ
(CIRu) cUu(e) = pu(e)(T − su) + (1− pu(e))sl − ψ(eu) ≥ Uu(e) = pu(e)T − ψ
(CICl) bUl(e) ≥ bUl(bel, eu) = pl(bel, eu)(T −sl)+(1−pl(bel, eu))su−ψ(bel), ∀bel 6= el
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(CICu) cUu(e) ≥ cUu(beu, el) = pl(beu, el)(T − su) + (1 − pu(beu, el))sl − ψ(beu),
∀beu 6= eu
(CLL) 0 ≤ sl, su ≤ T
Where (CIRl) ((CIRu))is the coalition participation constraint of agent Al (Au)
which brings stakes of collusion; (CICl) ((CICu)) is the coalition incentive com-
patibility constraint which resolves agent Al’s (Au) moral hazard in the coalition;
and (CLL) is the coalition limited liability constraint imposed on side payments.
It is easy to check that side contract sl = pu(e)T , su = pl(e)T solves the
optimization program [P.1]. This simple side contract yields the virtual incentive
power T − sl − su = 0, hence both agents are fully insured under this side contract
and thus have no incentives to work at all, which implements the low eﬀort pair e.
Q.E.D
5. SOPHISTICATED MECHANISM WITH MANIPULATED INFORMATION
5.1. Mechanism and Timing
Proposition 2 asserts that, due to perfect collusion, implementing eﬃcient eﬀort
pair is impossible under simple and direct tournament mechanisms, even though
unanonymous and biased promotion rules are taken into account.
We argue that, while the Revelation Principle fails in the grand mechanism
due to collusion, restricting attentions only to direct mechanisms would be never
optimal. Therefore, to implement eﬃcient eﬀort pair, indirect and sophisticated
mechanisms should be considered. According to the Principle of divide and conquer,
to undermine the coalition, the principal should create asymmetric information
between agents. Indeed, after selecting a favored agent, the principal can hide the
information about who is favored or not, and then reveals it only to one agent, say
agent A1. This brings asymmetric information into the coalition. The timing of this
sophisticated mechanism with manipulated information is illustrated as follows:
[Timing of the mechanism]
1. The principal proposes a grand mechanism G, which is approved if no agent
vetoes.
2. The principal tosses a coin to select a favored agent, and then reveals the
outcome only to the informed agent.
3. The side mediator proposes a side mechanism S, which is ratified if no agent
vetoes.
4. Both agents take eﬀorts simultaneously, which are only privately observed.
5. Outcomes realize; both grand and side contract are enforced.
Remark 1. By assumption v < 1, which implies that the lottery for the tie-
broken is fully stochastic. Hence, agents’ identities cannot be revealed through ex
post information, which implies that the side contract cannot be contingent on ex
post information.
Under this sophisticated mechanism with manipulated information, asymmetric
information between agents causes conflicts in the coalition. The side mediator
now faces two kinds of agents: the informed agent with hidden information as
well as hidden actions, and the uninformed agent with hidden actions only. By
the Revelation Principle, without loss of generality, the side mediator can design a
direct side mechanism S = {(El, Sl), (Eu, Su)} to extract the hidden information
of informed agent:
El = (e1l , e
2
u), Eu = (e
1
u, e
2
l ), Sl = (s
1
l , s
2
u), Su = (s
1
u, s
2
l )
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Where the subscripts l and u stand for lucky and unlucky type. Denote by
E = (El, Eu) eﬀort pairs of the coalition; with a bit abuse of notation, let C(E)
denote the coalition induces this eﬀort pair.
Under this side mechanism, the side mediator requires the informed agent A1
to report his type, that is, lucky or unlucky, then chooses a side contract according
to his report. For instance, if agent A1 reports his type "lucky", then side contract
(El = (e1l , e
2
u), Sl = (s
1
l , s
2
u)) will be chosen, which assigns agent A1(A2 ) eﬀort level
e1l (e
2
u) and side payment to his peer s1l (s
2
u) if he wins respectively.
5.2. Possibility of Implementing Eﬃcient Eﬀort Pair
Under this sophisticated grand mechanism with manipulated information, the
program of side contracting becomes much complicated, which involves in the incen-
tive problem of adverse selection with countervailing incentives, mixed with moral
hazard.6
In this paper, we are not motivated to solve the optimal collusion-proof tourna-
ment contract which implements the eﬃcient eﬀort pair. To prove that the eﬃcient
eﬀort pair is possible to be implemented, it is suﬃcient to show that there ex-
ists trade-oﬀ between rent extraction and eﬃciency which causes conflicts between
coalition truth-telling constraint and coalition participation constraints. The full
characterization of the program of side contracting is presented in appendix A.
First of all, consider the interim coalition participation constraints of the in-
formed agent, for the lucky and unlucky type respectively:
[CIR1l (E)]: bU1l (e1l , e2u) ≥ Ul(e)
[CIR1u(E)]: bU1u(e1u, e2l ) ≥ Uu(e)
And the ex ante coalition participation constraint of the uninformed agent:
[CIR2(E)]: bU2l (e2l , e1u) + bU2u(e2u, e1l ) ≥ Ul(e) + Uu(e)
Which can be rewritten by:
[CIR2(E)]: 12 [bU1l (e1l , e2u) + bU1u(e1u, e2l )] ≤ T − 12 [Ul(e) + Uu(e)]−Ψ
Where Ψ = 12 [ψ(e
1
l ) + ψ(e
1
u) + ψ(e
2
l ) + ψ(e
2
u)] is the expected eﬀort cost.
Under the biased promotion rule, agents have diﬀerent status quo utility levels
when participating into the coalition, which implies that they will claim diﬀerent
stakes of collusion. Let ∆bU(E) = bU1l (e1l , e2u)− bU1u(e1u, e2l ) denote the spread of utili-
ties between lucky and unlucky agents, ∆p(e) = pl(e)−pu(e) denote the probability
premium of winning. By combing two coalition participation constraints [CIR1l (E)]
and [CIR2(E)], yields the lower bound of ∆bU(E) determined by the diﬀerence of
the status quo utility:
∆bU(E) ≥ ∆p(e)T − (4ψ − 2Ψ).
The spread of utilities ∆bU(E), which brings incentives for the unlucky type to
mimic the lucky type, increases with tournament prize T . Hence, the problem of
countervailing incentives arrises as T becomes suﬃciently large, which implies that
the truth-telling constraint of the unlucky type is relevant:
[CTT 1u(E)]: bU1u(e1u, e2l ) ≥ bU1u,l(e1l , e2u) = bU1l (e1l , e2u)−∆p(e1l , e2u)T 1l
Where T 1l = T − s1l − s2u denotes the virtual incentive power of the informed
lucky agent, which measures the diﬀerence of the payments between high and low
positions under collusion. Note that, the utility level of the unlucky type when he
mimics the lucky type bU1u,l(e1l , e2u) can be decomposed into two terms: the first termbU1l (e1l , e2u) is the utility level of the lucky type, and the second term ∆p(e1l , e2u)T 1l
6 See Laﬀont and Martimort (2002) for detailed discuss.
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is the expected cost of his misreporting, which is the product of the probability
premium times the virtual incentive power of the lucky type.
To prevent the unlucky type from mimicing the lucky type, the side mediator
has to make s1l = s
2
u = 0 such that T 1l = T , and thus ensures that the expected
costs of misreporting exceeds the benefits of lying:
∆p(e1l , e
2
u)T ≥ ∆p(e)T − (4ψ − 2Ψ).
However, by the biased promotion rule yields∆p(e) = (2v−1)π21 > ∆p(e1l , e2u) =
(2v−1)π(e1l )π(e2u) for any El = (e1l , e2u) 6= e. This implies that the constraint above
cannot hold when T ≥ Tm(v) = 3ψ(2v−1)π1∆π , where T
m(v) = max 4ψ−2Ψ
[∆p(e)−∆p(e1l ,e2u)]
is the maximal threshold of tournament prize.
The side mediator must raise the virtual incentive power of the lucky type to
extract information rents of the unlucky type, which brings a trade-oﬀ between
rent-extraction and eﬃciency as the tournament prize T increases. When the tour-
nament prize T ≥ Tm(v), the contradiction between coalition truth-telling con-
straint of the unlucky type and the coalition participation constraints flunks the
program of side contracting for implementing eﬀort pair El = (e1l , e
2
u) 6= e. To
resolve this contradiction, the side mediator has to implement El = e under the
informed agent is lucky type. On the other hand, no trade-oﬀ causes the distortion
of coalition eﬀort levels when the informed agent is unlucky type, which implies
Eu = e. Hence, the eﬃcient eﬀort pair can be implemented in probability 12 , as
concluded in the following proposition:
Proposition 3. Under the sophisticated mechanism with manipulated infor-
mation, the eﬃcient eﬀort pair is possible to be implemented in spite of collusion.
Proof. The analysis above shows that, given tournament prize Tm(v), only El =
e is feasible when the informed agent is lucky type. To induce (El = e,Eu = e),
consider the side contract S which satisfies: s1l = s
2
u = 0, s1u = s2l =
1
2T
∗(v). This
side contract yields the virtual incentive power T 1l = T
m(v) and T 1u = T −s1u−s2l =
0. It is easy to check that all the coalition constraints are satisfied under this side
contract, inducing eﬀort pairs (El = e,Eu = e) in the coalition. Q.E.D
Remark 2. In the program of side contracting, we exclude the possibility that
the side mediator may design a pooling side contract to induce low eﬀort levels,
since the pooling side contract is ineﬃcient and thus cannot implement any collusive
eﬀort pair e 6= e, as shown in the appendix B.
Remark 3. Under this mechanism, Tm(v) = 3ψ(2v−1)π1∆π > T
∗, hence imple-
menting eﬃcient eﬀort pair entails strictly higher costs than the optimal tourna-
ment prize in the absence of collusion. In this paper, however, we only focus on
the problem of implementing the eﬃcient eﬀort pair under perfect collusion, and
ignore the problem of seeking for an optimal collusion-proof mechanism.
By manipulating information of agents’ identities, the principal brings asymmet-
ric information between agents, which causes the trade-oﬀ between rent extraction
and eﬃciency in the coalition. Under the biased promotion rule, the lucky type has
higher status quo utility than the unlucky type and the spread of status quo utilities
between two agents increases with tournament prize. When joining the coalition,
the lucky type must be allocated more stakes of collusion to compensate his higher
participation costs, which brings incentives for the unlucky type to mimic the lucky
type. To prevent the unlucky type from lying, the side mediator must raise the
virtual incentive power of the lucky type such that the cost of misreporting exceeds
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the benefit of lying which also increases with tournament prize. However, due to
limited liability constraint, the virtual incentive power is bounded above to be less
than the tournament prize, which imposes an upper bound on the unlucky type’s
cost of misreporting. As a result, the side mediator has to raise the coalition eﬀort
levels when the informed agent is lucky type, which leads to a loss of eﬃciency in
the coalition. As the tournament prize becomes large enough, only high eﬀort levels
can be implemented when the informed agent is lucky type.
Remark 4. Under this program of side contracting, the problem of moral hazard
has no bites to the coalition, since it can be easily resolved through side transferring
which entails no costs. Hence, only asymmetric information makes sense in fighting
collusion under this mechanism.
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Tackling collusion is a permanent challenge faced by politicians and scholars,
and therefore deserves more attention in both practice and theory. The principle
of divide and conquer has been developed in the practice of anti-collusion for a
long history with a great success, however, it has been greatly ignored in economic
theory of collusion-proof mechanism design.
This paper highlights the principle of divide and conquer by showing how the
principal can benefit from manipulating information which creates conflicts in the
coalition and thus undermine its eﬃciency. Hence, it bridges the practice of anti-
collusion to the theory. Although the main theme is based on a simple tournament
model, unquestionably, the basic idea and new concept can be applied to other
settings, which leaves many tasks to further research in the future.
7. APPENDIX A: FULL CHARACTERIZATION OF SIDE CONTRACTING
PROGRAM
Given the side contract described above, the agents’ utility levels in the coalition
are expressed by:bU1l (e1l , e2u) = pl(e1l , e2u)(T − s1l ) + [1− pl(e1l , e2u)]s2u − ψ(e1l )bU1u(e1u, e2l ) = pu(e1u, e2l )(T − s1u) + [1− pu(e1u, e2l )]s2l − ψ(e1u)bU2l (e2l , e1u) = pl(e2l , e1u)(T − s2l ) + [1− pl(e2l , e1u)]s1u − ψ(e2l )bU2u(e2u, e1l ) = pu(e2u, e1l )(T − s2u) + [1− pu(e2u, e1l )]s1l − ψ(e2u)
Suppose the informed agent is lucky type. Let bU1l,u(e1u, e2l ) denote his utility level
when he misreports his type "unlucky", bU1l (be1l , e2u) denote his utility level when he
takes eﬀort level be1l rather than e1l , and bU1l,u(be1u, e2l ) denote his utility level when he
misreports as well as misbehaves. To form coalition C(E), the following constraints
of the informed agent must be satisfied:
[CTT 1l (E)]: bU1l (e1l , e2u) ≥ bU1l,u(e1u, e2l )
[CTM1l (E)]: bU1l (e1l , e2u) ≥ bU1l,u(be1u, e2l )
[CIC1l (E)]: bU1l (e1l , e2u) ≥ bU1l (be1l , e2u)
[CIR1l (E)]: bU1l (e1l , e2u) ≥ Ul(e)
[CLL(E)]: 0 ≤ s1l , s2u ≤ T
Where [CIR1l (E)] is the coalition participation constraint that guarantees his
stakes of collusion; [CTT 1l (E)] is the coalition truth-telling constraint that warrants
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his truth-telling; [CIC1l (E)] is the coalition incentive compatibility constraint to
prevent him from misbehaving; and [CTM1l (E)] is the coalition truth-telling and
right-behaving constraint which ensures that he has no incentive to misreport as
well as misbehave. Moreover, [CLL(E)] is the coalition limited liability constraint
that ensures non-negative utility levels under collusion.
By the same reason, the following constraints must be met when the informed
agent is unlucky type:
[CTT 1u(E)]: bU1u(e1u, e2l ) ≥ bU1u,l(e1l , e2u)
[CTM1u(E)]: bU1u(e1u, e2l ) ≥ bU1u,l(be1l , e2u)
[CIC1u(E)]: bU1u(e1u, e2l ) ≥ bU1u(be1u, e2l )
[CIR1u(E)]: bU1u(e1u, e2l ) ≥ Uu(e)
[CLL(E)]: 0 ≤ s1u, s2l ≤ T
We now consider the program of the uninformed agent A2. First of all, the ex
ante coalition participation constraint must be satisfied since he is uninformed:
[CIR2(E)]: bU2l (e2l , e1u) + bU2u(e2u, e1l ) ≥ Ul(e) + Uu(e)
After the informed agent reporting his type, agents’ identities become common
knowledge. This implies that the following interim coalition incentive compatibility
constraint of the lucky and unlucky type must be met:
[CIC2l (E)]: bU2l (e2l , e1u) ≥ bU2l (be2l , e1u)
[CIC2u(E)]: bU2u(e2u, e1l ) ≥ bU2u(be2u, e1l )
We can now characterize the optimization program of side contracting as follows:
Program [P.2]:
max
{S}
bU1(E) + bU2(E) = 12 [bU1l (e1l , e2u) + bU1u(e1u, e2l ) + bU2l (e2l , e1u) + bU2u(e2u, e1l )]
= T − 12 [ψ(e1l ) + ψ(e1u) + ψ(e2l ) + ψ(e2u)]
Subject to all constraints above.
Denoting by T 1l = T−s1l −s2u and T 1u = T−s1u−s2l the virtual incentive power of
the informed lucky agent and informed unlucky agent respectively, which measures
the diﬀerence of the payments between high and low positions under collusion;
denoting by Ψ = 12 [ψ(e
1
l )+ψ(e
1
u)+ψ(e2l )+ψ(e
2
u)] the expected eﬀort costs, we can
rewrite the program as follows:
Program [P.2]: max
{S}
bU1(E) + bU2(E) = T −Ψ
Subject to:
[CTT 1l (E)]: bU1l (e1l , e2u) ≥ bU1u(e1u, e2l ) + [pl(e1u, e2l )− pu(e1u, e2l )]T 1u
[CTT 1u(E)]: bU1u(e1u, e2l ) ≥ bU1l (e1l , e2u)− [pl(e1l , e2u)− pu(e1l , e2u)]T 1l
[CTM1l (E)]: bU1l (e1l , e2u) ≥ bU1u(e1u, e2l )+[pl(be1u, e2l )−pu(e1u, e2l )]T 1u+ψ(e1u)−ψ(be1u)
[CTM1u(E)]: bU1u(e1u, e2l ) ≥ bU1l (e1l , e2u)− [pl(e1l , e2u)−pu(be1l , e2u)]T 1l +ψ(e1l )−ψ(be1l )
[CIR1l (E)]: bU1l (e1l , e2u) ≥ Ul(e)
[CIR1u(E)]: bU1u(e1u, e2l ) ≥ Uu(e)
[CIR2(E)]: 12 [bU1l (e1l , e2u) + bU1u(e1u, e2l )] ≤ T − 12 [Ul(e) + Uu(e)]−Ψ
[CIC1l (E)]: [pl(be1l , e2u)− pl(e1l , e2u)]T 1l ≤ ψ(be1l )− ψ(e1l )
[CIC1u(E)]: [pu(be1u, e2l )− pu(e1u, e2l )]T 1u ≤ ψ(be1u)− ψ(e1u)
[CIC2l (E)]: [pl(be2l , e1u)− pl(e2l , e1u)]T 1u ≤ ψ(be2l )− ψ(e2l )
[CIC2u(E)]: [pu(be2u, e1l )− pu(e2u, e1l )]T 1l ≤ ψ(be2u)− ψ(e2u)
[CLL(E)]: −T ≤ T 1l , T 1u ≤ T
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8. APPENDIX B: POOLING SIDE CONTRACT
Proposition 4. Given tournament prize T = Tm(v), only eﬃcient eﬀort pair
e can be implemented under pooling side contract.
Proof. Suppose the side mediator proposes a pooling side contract SP (e) =
{e = (e1, e2), s = (s1, s2)} which assigns the informed agent A1 a pair of eﬀort
level and side payment (e1, s1), and uninformed agent A2 a pair (e2, s2). Then the
following coalition constraints must be satisfied:
[CIR1l (e)]: bU1l (e1, e2) ≥ Ul(e)
[CIC1l (e)]: bU1l (e1, e2) ≥ bU1l (be1, e2)
[CIR1u(e)]: bU1u(e1, e2) ≥ Uu(e)
[CIC1u(e)]: bU1u(e1, e2) ≥ bU1u(be1, e2)
[CIR2(e)]: bU2l (e2, e1) + bU2u(e2, e1) ≥ Ul(e) + Uu(e)
[CIC2(e)]: bU2l (e2, e1) + bU2u(e2, e1) ≥ bU2l (be2, e1) + bU2u(be2, e1)
[CLL(e)]: 0 ≤ s1, s2 ≤ T
Rewrite these constraints as follows:
[CIR1l (e)]: (1− pl(e))s2 − pl(e)s1 ≥ (pl(e)− pl(e))T + ψ(e1)− ψ
[CIR1u(e)]: (1− pu(e))s2 − pu(e)s1 ≥ (pu(e)− pu(e))T + ψ(e1)− ψ
[CIR2(e)]: (2 − pl(e) − pu(e))s1 − (pl(e) + pu(e))s2 ≥ (1 − pl(e) − pu(e))T +
2ψ(e2)− 2ψ
[CIC1l (e)]: (pl(be1, e2)− pl(e))(s1 + s2) ≥ (pl(be1, e2)− pl(e))T + ψ(e1)− ψ(be1)
[CIC1u(e)]: (pu(be1, e2)− pu(e))(s1+ s2) ≥ (pu(be1, e2)− pu(e))T +ψ(e1)−ψ(be1)
[CIC2(e)]: (pl(e1, be2) + pu(e1, be2) − pl(e) − pu(e))(s1 + s2) ≥ (pl(e1, be2) +
pu(e1, be2)− pl(e)− pu(e))T + 2ψ(e2)− 2ψ(be2)
[CLL(e)]: 0 ≤ s1, s2 ≤ T
First of all, consider coalition C(e) induced by a side contract SP (e) = {e =
(0, 0), s = (s1, s2)}. The relevant constraints are expressed by:
[CIR1l (e)]: pu(e)s
2 − pl(e)s1 ≥ (pl(e)− pl(e))T − ψ
[CIR2(e)]: s1 − s2 ≥ −2ψ
[CIC1l (e)]: s
1 + s2 ≥ T − ψpl(e)−pl(e)
From [CIR1l (e)] and [CIR
2(e)] we get:
s1 + s2 ≤ 4ψpl(e)− pu(e) −
pl(e)−pl(e)
pl(e)− pu(e)T (#)
It is easy to check that, given T = Tm(v), this constraint contradicts to
[CIC1l (e)] for any pair of side payments (s
1, s2), which implies that coalition CE(e)
cannot be sustained.
In a similar way, one can check coalition C(be) (C(e)) which induces the informed
agent to work (shirk) and uninformed to shirk (work) are not sustainable. Hence
only null coalition C(e) can be implemented when the side mediator restrict to
pooling side contract. Q.E.D
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